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  1. Microsoft Intune
  2. Microsoft Tunnel
Microsoft Tunnel for Intune

When your network inspects TLS, Tunnel connections do not slow down. They stop working.

Microsoft Tunnel puts a VPN gateway in a Linux container so iOS, iPadOS, and Android Enterprise devices can reach on-premises resources, authenticated through Entra and gated by Conditional Access. Whether it belongs in your environment usually comes down to two published facts: client sessions must not be inspected anywhere in the path, and the product does not use FIPS-compliant algorithms. We check both before anything gets built.

Start a Tunnel feasibility checkRead the constraints
Microsoft Tunnel VPN gateway for Intune for US organizations
  • iOS and AndroidThe supported client platforms
  • Linux containerWhere the gateway runs
  • No inspectionTLS break and inspect breaks connections
  • 500 rulesTotal split tunneling budget, include plus exclude
How it works

Seven facts that shape a Tunnel design.

Per Microsoft, Tunnel is a VPN gateway for Intune, running containerized on Linux, that lets iOS, iPadOS, and Android Enterprise devices reach on-premises resources under modern authentication and Conditional Access. Most of what follows is about fit, because the platform's boundaries are published and firm.

Inspection in the client path is fatal, not slow

The documentation leaves no room: no SSL break and inspect, no TLS break and inspect, no deep packet inspection on client connections, and any firewall, proxy, or load balancer that terminates and inspects sessions headed into the gateway is unsupported and makes client connections fail outright. Networks that inspect everything need an exception carved out before this product can exist in them.

FIPS-compliant algorithms are absent

One sentence in the documentation carries the weight: Microsoft Tunnel does not use Federal Information Processing Standard compliant algorithms. Commercial businesses may shrug; federal contractors, defense supply chain companies scoping CMMC, and anyone whose agreements cite FIPS 140 validation cannot. It is a five-minute check that can save the whole project, so it happens first.

The gateway is a container on a Linux host

Physical or virtual, in your data center or in a cloud. Microsoft's caveat on cloud hosting is that something like Azure ExpressRoute must extend the on-premises network out to it, which adds real cost and complexity to that option. Depending on version, the container runtime is Podman or Docker.

Sites are the unit of design

Each Linux server joins exactly one Site, and the Site is what devices actually connect to: it owns the public IP or FQDN, which may point at a load balancer, and it pushes a single server configuration onto every member server. Growth means adding servers to a Site, and they inherit everything.

Channel behavior, and the routing budget

The client brings up a TCP/TLS control channel that doubles as a fallback data path, then attempts a UDP channel over datagram TLS for primary data, both on port 443 by default. Routing is governed by a split tunneling allowance of 500 rules total across include and exclude, so a design using 300 includes has 200 excludes left.

Per-app scope, and an invisible mode

VPN profiles decide which apps traverse the tunnel; leave the app list empty on an always-on profile and every packet from the device goes through. On iOS, setting TunnelOnly to true with per-app VPN means users never open or sign in to Defender for the tunnel to function, at the price of losing Defender's protection features.

Compliance gating, and root detection

Access is gated in the VPN client through Conditional Access against the Microsoft Tunnel Gateway cloud app; a device out of compliance gets no token from Entra and never reaches the server. On Android, Defender adds its own tripwire, instantly cutting Tunnel access for rooted devices, raising their risk to High and severing live connections until compliance returns.

The design conversation that has to happen first

Full traffic inspection and Tunnel cannot share a path.

Three separate passages of the documentation repeat the same prohibition, and what fails is connectivity itself, not throughput.

  • Quoted: Tunnel Gateway does not support SSL break and inspect, TLS break and inspect, or deep packet inspection for client connections.
  • Quoted: the use of firewalls, proxies, load balancers, or any technology that terminates and inspects the client sessions that go into the Tunnel Gateway is not supported and causes client connections to fail.
  • A subtler variant applies to the gateway's own egress: an outbound proxy in front of it must not break and inspect either, since the management agent speaks mutual TLS to Intune. Where a proxy inspects by default, the gateway's IP and FQDN belong on the exemption list for the Intune endpoints.
  • Microsoft is not dismissive of inspection stacks; it notes they mitigate real risk for ordinary internet traffic while dramatically degrading performance, scale, and user experience against Tunnel and Intune endpoints. The workable path is a scoped exception negotiated with the security team before the pilot, not during it.
Get the inspection question answered first
How we approach it

What we actually contribute to a Tunnel project.

Tunnel has crisp boundaries. Our job is figuring out, cheaply and early, which side of them you are on, and then building only if the answer says build.

The inspection verdict comes in week one

Because inspected client sessions fail outright, and because even the gateway's outbound proxy is barred from inspecting (the management agent uses mutual TLS to Intune), the first deliverable is a written answer from your network team about what touches TLS in the path. Everything else waits on it. We work remotely and put it in writing.

Topology follows resources, not hardware

We lay out Sites according to where the resources and users are, give each a public address, load-balanced where warranted, and let the shared server configuration handle every server added later. Estates designed server-first end up rebuilding their topology at the first capacity increase.

The 500-rule budget is spent on purpose

Organizations with sprawling internal address space can burn through the shared include-and-exclude allowance surprisingly fast. Summarized routes, planned before deployment, keep the count low; enumerating subnets one at a time finds the limit the hard way.

Enrollment status is a licensing fork

The base product serves enrolled iOS, iPadOS, and Android Enterprise devices. Unenrolled phones need Tunnel for Mobile Application Management, which Microsoft classes as an advanced capability with licensing beyond Intune. Sorting devices into those buckets early keeps the commercial picture honest.

Where this fits

Where Tunnel earns a place.

The typical candidate runs real on-premises systems, already manages devices in Intune, and would rather not maintain a second vendor stack just for mobile VPN.

On-premises systems that mobile staff still need

File shares, internal web apps, and legacy line-of-business systems with no cloud successor. Tunnel reaches them from managed mobile devices with Entra authentication and Conditional Access in front, all run from the console the devices already live in, with no extra appliance or vendor.

Compliance verified before the connection exists

Because Conditional Access runs in the client against the Tunnel Gateway cloud app, an out-of-compliance device is refused a token and never touches the VPN server. For firms answering GLBA, FTC Safeguards, or SOC 2 access criteria, pre-connection enforcement reads very differently from a VPN that checks afterward, or never.

Contractor phones that will never enroll

Consultants and contractors need internal access from devices your MDM will never own. Tunnel for MAM covers exactly that unenrolled population, and since Microsoft licenses it as an advanced capability beyond base Intune, the budget line belongs in the design phase.

Zero tolerance for traffic outside the tunnel

Android's Strict Tunnel Mode stops every packet when the VPN drops, so nothing slips out unprotected. Enrolled devices get it with always-on VPN enabled; unenrolled devices under Tunnel for MAM configure it through the Edge app configuration policy.

Compromised handsets near patient data

Defender's client watches for rooting on Android and reacts immediately: risk set to High, live Tunnel sessions cut, access denied until the device is compliant again. For HIPAA-covered organizations with clinicians on mobile, that sits alongside, not instead of, rooted-device compliance policy.

Several campuses, resources at each

Sites map naturally onto locations: each campus gets a Site with its own public address and shared configuration, devices connect where their resources are, and new servers slot into the right Site inheriting its settings.

Three positions

How US organizations give mobile devices access to on-premises systems.

The middle column describes many estates today: a legacy VPN app on phones, password-based, unaware of device health, generating tickets at every certificate renewal.
Modern authentication
Microsoft TunnelYes
Traditional mobile VPN clientVaries
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Conditional Access enforced before connection
Microsoft TunnelYes
Traditional mobile VPN clientRarely
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Per-app VPN
Microsoft TunnelYes
Traditional mobile VPN clientSometimes
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Rooted Android blocked automatically
Microsoft TunnelYes
Traditional mobile VPN clientNo
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Device traffic halted when the tunnel drops
Microsoft TunnelYes, on Android
Traditional mobile VPN clientRarely
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Works for unenrolled devices
Microsoft TunnelWith Tunnel for MAM
Traditional mobile VPN clientSometimes
No mobile access to internal systemsNo
Administered from the device management console
Microsoft TunnelYes
Traditional mobile VPN clientNo
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Compatible with full traffic inspection
Microsoft TunnelNo
Traditional mobile VPN clientOften
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
FIPS-validated algorithms
Microsoft TunnelNo
Traditional mobile VPN clientVaries
No mobile access to internal systemsNot applicable
Infrastructure to run
Microsoft TunnelLinux servers
Traditional mobile VPN clientAppliances
No mobile access to internal systemsNone
Feature
Microsoft Tunnel
Traditional mobile VPN client
No mobile access to internal systems
Modern authentication
YesVariesNot applicable
Conditional Access enforced before connection
YesRarelyNot applicable
Per-app VPN
YesSometimesNot applicable
Rooted Android blocked automatically
YesNoNot applicable
Device traffic halted when the tunnel drops
Yes, on AndroidRarelyNot applicable
Works for unenrolled devices
With Tunnel for MAMSometimesNo
Administered from the device management console
YesNoNot applicable
Compatible with full traffic inspection
NoOftenNot applicable
FIPS-validated algorithms
NoVariesNot applicable
Infrastructure to run
Linux serversAppliancesNone
The configuration model

What goes where, and what each setting decides.

The published settings, arranged by which object owns them: Server configuration, Site, or VPN profile.

Element

IP address range

Where it is configured
Server configuration
What it decides
The pool handed to connecting clients; PAT keeps these addresses hidden from the rest of the network

Element

DNS servers and suffix search

Where it is configured
Server configuration
What it decides
Internal name resolution for connected devices

Element

Split tunneling rules

Where it is configured
Server configuration
What it decides
The 500-rule allowance spanning include and exclude routes

Element

Listening port

Where it is configured
Server configuration
What it decides
443 by default for TCP and UDP alike; changing it means matching firewall work

Element

Public IP address or FQDN

Where it is configured
Site
What it decides
What clients dial; a load balancer address is acceptable here

Element

Server configuration assignment

Where it is configured
Site
What it decides
One configuration pushed to all member servers, so capacity adds are clean

Element

Site membership

Where it is configured
Installation script
What it decides
Fixed per server when the tunnel software is installed

Element

Per-app VPN and always-on

Where it is configured
VPN profile
What it decides
Scopes the tunnel to named apps, or to everything when no apps are listed

Element

On-demand VPN rules

Where it is configured
VPN profile, iOS and iPadOS
What it decides
Brings the tunnel up conditionally for defined names or addresses

Element

Strict Tunnel Mode

Where it is configured
VPN profile on Android, or Edge app configuration for MAM
What it decides
Halts all device traffic when the tunnel drops, preventing bypass

Element

Proxy support

Where it is configured
VPN profile, iOS and iPadOS and Android 11 or later
What it decides
Routes tunnel traffic via an internal proxy

Element

TunnelOnly mode

Where it is configured
Defender configuration, iOS and iPadOS
What it decides
Drops the Defender sign-in requirement and its protection features together
ElementWhere it is configuredWhat it decides
IP address rangeServer configurationThe pool handed to connecting clients; PAT keeps these addresses hidden from the rest of the network
DNS servers and suffix searchServer configurationInternal name resolution for connected devices
Split tunneling rulesServer configurationThe 500-rule allowance spanning include and exclude routes
Listening portServer configuration443 by default for TCP and UDP alike; changing it means matching firewall work
Public IP address or FQDNSiteWhat clients dial; a load balancer address is acceptable here
Server configuration assignmentSiteOne configuration pushed to all member servers, so capacity adds are clean
Site membershipInstallation scriptFixed per server when the tunnel software is installed
Per-app VPN and always-onVPN profileScopes the tunnel to named apps, or to everything when no apps are listed
On-demand VPN rulesVPN profile, iOS and iPadOSBrings the tunnel up conditionally for defined names or addresses
Strict Tunnel ModeVPN profile on Android, or Edge app configuration for MAMHalts all device traffic when the tunnel drops, preventing bypass
Proxy supportVPN profile, iOS and iPadOS and Android 11 or laterRoutes tunnel traffic via an internal proxy
TunnelOnly modeDefender configuration, iOS and iPadOSDrops the Defender sign-in requirement and its protection features together
How an engagement runs

How we run it, feasibility first.

Usually 4-8 weeks, remote throughout. Installing the gateway is the quick part; the network exception and the population and licensing decisions are the long poles.
  1. 1

    The go or no-go check

    Three questions, answered in writing: does anything inspect client TLS in the path (unsupported, connections fail); does any contract or framework require FIPS-validated cryptography (Tunnel does not use FIPS algorithms); and is the device scope confined to iOS, iPadOS, and Android Enterprise (all Tunnel supports).

  2. 2

    Topology and network design

    Site count driven by resource locations, each with its public address or load balancer. Host placement for the Linux servers, remembering that cloud placement drags ExpressRoute or similar into scope. Firewall changes for TCP and UDP on the chosen port, default 443.

  3. 3

    Configure and install

    The server configuration takes shape: client address pool, DNS and suffix search, split tunneling within the shared 500-rule allowance, listening port. The admin center's installation script then runs on each Linux host, binding it to its Site, on Podman or Docker as the version dictates.

  4. 4

    Client rollout

    Defender ships to devices as the tunnel client. Profiles use the Microsoft Tunnel connection type: per-app or full-device, always-on where wanted, iOS on-demand rules, Android Strict Tunnel Mode, and TunnelOnly where a Defender sign-in prompt would stall adoption.

  5. 5

    Enforcement proof and handover

    We demonstrate the negative case: a noncompliant device denied its token and refused. Rooted-device behavior is exercised on Android, compliance policy aligned with it, and the run book for patching hosts and rotating certificates lands with your team in writing.

Straight answers

What organizations ask about Microsoft Tunnel.

iOS, iPadOS, and Android Enterprise, per Microsoft's description. Tunnel is purpose-built for mobile; Windows and macOS remote access are different problems with different answers. For phones and tablets outside Intune enrollment, the same gateway extends to them through Tunnel for Mobile Application Management.

No. The documentation says Tunnel Gateway supports no SSL or TLS break and inspect and no deep packet inspection on client connections, and that anything terminating and inspecting sessions bound for the gateway, firewall, proxy, or load balancer, is unsupported and causes failures. The path forward is an agreed exemption, not clever routing.

No. Microsoft's note is one line: Tunnel does not use FIPS-compliant algorithms. US organizations should weigh this early, because federal contracts, agency rules, and CMMC scopes that call for FIPS 140 validation turn that single line into a disqualifier. We ask about it in the first meeting for exactly that reason.

One or more Linux servers, physical or virtual, each running the gateway container on Podman or Docker depending on version. They can live on-premises or in a cloud, with Microsoft noting the cloud case requires extending your network via something like ExpressRoute. Supported distributions are listed on Microsoft's prerequisites page, which is worth checking fresh since the list moves.

Think settings versus destination. The Server configuration bundles the technical parameters: client address pool, DNS, split tunneling rules, listening port. The Site is what devices connect to, holding the public IP or FQDN, possibly a load balancer's, and stamping its one server configuration onto every server that joins it.

500, pooled across include and exclude. Microsoft's worked example: 300 includes leaves at most 200 excludes. Large or fragmented address spaces need summarized routes from day one, because the limit is real and renegotiating routing after deployment is painful.

443 for both protocols unless changed. The TCP/TLS channel handles control and serves as backup data; a DTLS channel over UDP carries data when it can establish. When UDP is blocked or flaky, traffic rides the TCP fallback. Change the port and the firewall rules change with it.

They will not. Address assignments to clients stay invisible to the wider network; the gateway performs port address translation and everything arrives bearing the Linux host's source IP. Plan for that anywhere source addresses drive logging, authorization, or SIEM correlation.

On iOS, not if TunnelOnly mode is enabled alongside per-app VPN: Microsoft states users then need not open or sign in to Defender for the tunnel to work, assuming a valid token exists via Company Portal or another app signed in with multifactor authentication. The cost is explicit: TunnelOnly switches off Defender's protection, leaving just the tunnel.

Android has Strict Tunnel Mode, which freezes all device traffic the moment the VPN drops so nothing routes around it. It requires always-on VPN for enrolled devices; for unenrolled devices under Tunnel for MAM, the equivalent lives in the Microsoft Edge app configuration policy.

Two layers. First, Conditional Access inside the VPN client, evaluated against the Tunnel Gateway cloud app: no compliance, no token, no connection. Second, on Android, Defender's own root detection, which cuts access instantly, flags the device High risk, kills active sessions, and holds the block until compliance is restored.

Scoped per engagement. The drivers are Site and server count, whether the unenrolled population pulls Tunnel for MAM licensing into scope, and how much network negotiation the inspection constraint demands. We run the short feasibility check first, because a fast honest no is the cheapest outcome this project can have.
Feasibility first

Fifteen checks, ordered so the fatal ones come first.

The first group can end the project on its own, so it gets answered before any Linux host exists. The second shapes the build. The third covers clients and the licensing fork.

Go or no-go

  • Is client TLS inspected anywhere en route?
    Unsupported; connections fail.
  • Do any obligations cite FIPS validation?
    The product does not use FIPS algorithms.
  • Is the scope limited to iOS and Android?
    Nothing else is supported.
  • On-premises host, or cloud?
    Cloud requires ExpressRoute or equivalent.
  • Can 443 open both directions, TCP and UDP?
    The default for both channels.

Topology

  • How many Sites does geography demand?
    Each server joins exactly one Site.
  • Load balancer at the front?
    Allowed as the Site address, provided it never inspects.
  • How close will you run to 500 routing rules?
    Include and exclude share the budget.
  • Named apps, or the whole device?
    An empty app list tunnels everything.
  • Does data leakage on drop matter?
    Strict Tunnel Mode exists for that, on Android.

Clients and licensing

  • Enrolled fleet, unenrolled, or both?
    Unenrolled requires Tunnel for MAM.
  • Is the MAM add-on licensed?
    Extra licensing beyond Intune, per Microsoft.
  • Is Defender rolled out?
    Defender is the client application.
  • Do compliance policies exist and bite?
    They are what Conditional Access evaluates.
  • Do compliance rules cover rooted devices?
    Client-side detection is a complement, not the policy.
Related reading

The pages around this one.

Entra Global Secure Access

Microsoft's security service edge, and the scenarios where it competes with or complements Tunnel.

Learn more

Mobile threat defense

Defender on phones as a security product in its own right, beyond its role as Tunnel client.

Learn more

Intune Suite

The licensing home of Tunnel for MAM, with the trial terms that govern evaluating it.

Learn more
Next step

One email to your network team settles most of this.

Find out whether client TLS gets inspected anywhere end to end. If yes, Tunnel needs an exception before it needs a server; if no, the build is straightforward. Either way you learn it before spending anything on a pilot.

Start a Tunnel feasibility checkSee Microsoft Intune services

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