Disaster recovery that has been tested, not just promised.

A backup is a copy of your data and nothing more. Recovery is the plan, the architecture and the procedures that turn that copy back into a working business inside an agreed window. Almost every disaster exposes gaps in the recovery process rather than in the backups themselves: no runbook, a restore target somebody misconfigured, dependencies nobody wrote down. All of that is what this addresses.

It turns on what an hour of downtime costs on each individual system. Most mid-market businesses settle at fifteen minutes of data and one hour of downtime for anything production or customer-facing, four hours and eight hours for internal and reporting systems, and a day for anything archival. That gets modeled with you during the impact analysis rather than assumed.

Only where your critical systems have to be back inside fifteen minutes. For most companies a warm site replicated into the cloud reaches an hour comfortably at a fraction of the cost. A genuinely hot site belongs to regulated finance, to healthcare handling patient records, and to online retail where the checkout being down is the whole problem.

Three layers of it. Backups made immutable so nothing an attacker does can encrypt them, real segmentation between production and the recovery site, and recovery procedures that have actually been tested. A ransomware simulation forms part of the annual rehearsal on the upper tiers. Recovering from ransomware is the main event here rather than an unusual case.

No. A tabletop walkthrough runs alongside normal operations without touching anything. A genuine failover is scoped to a replica outside production, inside a short window, with everybody affected told in advance. We have never taken production down during a rehearsal.

The incident is detected and the recovery team activates the runbook while your people deal with customers, the board and anybody else asking. Within the hour failover has started and the recovery site is coming up. By the fourth hour the critical systems are running and the message has gone out to customers. Inside the first day full operations are back and forensic work begins on what caused it. A week later there is a review and the runbooks get corrected. Insurers, regulators and law enforcement all get coordinated with wherever that is required.

The documentation lines up against the business continuity standard, the continuity requirements inside ISO 27001, the continuity controls in the NIST framework, and the FEMA continuity of operations guidance wherever that applies to you. The evidence gets packaged for your auditors rather than left for them to assemble. A good many clients use this program as their primary continuity control and nothing else.

Yes. We start with a current-state assessment, a gap report against your declared targets, and a written remediation plan. Most takeovers find gaps in three places: missing runbooks, untested restore paths, and missing immutability on backups. We close them on a fixed timeline.