Count how many Global Administrators you have. Then work out how many of them genuinely need that access at nine on an ordinary Tuesday.
What this does is convert permanent administrative access into access a person switches on when they have a reason to, behind an approval, a written justification, a multifactor check and a countdown. The permissions themselves do not change at all. What changes is how long they last and whether anyone else can see who used them.

- Just in timeActivated, not held permanently
- Time-boundStart and end dates on assignments
- ApprovalRequired before elevation
- Audit historyDownloadable for internal or external audit
The lockout everyone imagines is not actually possible.
This is the first objection raised in every single conversation, and the product answers it directly.
- The service will not let you remove the final active Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator assignment. Reducing your tenant to zero standing administrators by mistake is simply not available as an outcome, and that is precisely the disaster everyone pictures the first time this model is explained to them.
- Even so, the standard practice remains to keep a small number of emergency access accounts outside the model entirely, stored securely, watched for any use, and tested on a fixed schedule. We build those as part of the deployment rather than adding them later, on the simple grounds that a break-glass account nobody has tested is not a break-glass account.
- People conflate eligibility with approval friction, and the two are separate. A role can be eligible with nobody approving and no waiting at all, asking only for a multifactor check and a written reason. That configuration on its own eliminates standing privilege and starts producing an audit trail, which makes it a sensible first move well before any approval workflow is introduced.
- The order that works is eligibility first with undemanding activation requirements, then approval added on the highest roles once the team has settled into the rhythm, then time-bound assignments and access reviews after that. Switching everything on simultaneously is how these deployments get reversed in their second week.
Eight capabilities, plus a single distinction that makes sense of the entire product.
Eligible versus active, which is the whole idea
An eligible assignment requires the person to do something before they can use the role. An active assignment requires nothing at all. Then comes the sentence that matters most in the whole documentation set: the access granted by a permanent assignment and by an eligible one is identical, and the only real difference is that some people do not need that access all the time. Everything else follows from that.
Just in time and time-bound are not the same idea
Just in time describes a person activating a role for a bounded period after which the permissions lapse. Time-bound describes the assignment itself carrying start and end dates, so eligibility for the role finishes on a known date rather than persisting until somebody happens to remember it. Both are supported, and each solves a different problem. The first shrinks your daily exposure. The second is what stops a contractor still being eligible for something two years after their project finished.
Approval before elevation
A role can be set to require approval before it activates. The named approvers get an email, can see what is pending, and can approve or reject requests one at a time or in bulk, recording their reasoning as they go. That single mechanism turns privileged access from something an administrator simply possesses into something with another human involved, which is what most auditors are really asking about when they ask about privileged access.
Multifactor authentication at the moment of elevation
You can require multifactor authentication at the moment a role is activated, which is a considerably stronger position than requiring it only when somebody signs in. An attacker sitting on a live session on an administrator machine still has to pass a check at the point privilege is actually used, instead of inheriting whatever that administrator authenticated with several hours earlier.
Justification, which creates the record
Because a reason is entered at activation, the audit record captures more than who elevated and when. It captures what they said they needed it for. That turns out to be one of the more valuable outputs, since it makes privileged activity reviewable by somebody who was nowhere near it at the time, and the requirement changes behavior simply by being there.
Notifications when privileged roles are activated
With activation notifications on, a Global Administrator elevation becomes visible to somebody other than the person performing it, more or less as it happens. For a small IT team that is often the quickest detection available anywhere in their estate for an administrative credential being used by the wrong hands, and configuring it costs nothing.
Access reviews, extension and renewal
Access reviews establish whether people still need what they hold. Alongside that, a user whose time-bound assignment is nearing its end can request an extension, and once it has lapsed they can request a renewal, with both routes requiring approval from a Global Administrator or a Privileged Role Administrator. The effect is that access expires unless somebody actively asks for it to continue, which inverts how almost every organization currently works.
Audit history you can hand to an auditor
The audit history downloads for internal or external use. When an American business faces a SOC 2 examination, a HIPAA security assessment, an NYDFS Part 500 review or an insurance questionnaire, that file answers the privileged access questions on its own, in place of a screenshot of a group membership and somebody promising it gets reviewed.
Four things that determine whether any of this is still running a month later.
We start with eligibility, not approval
Phase one turns permanent active assignments into eligible ones, gated by a multifactor check and a written reason, with nobody approving anything. That step alone eliminates standing privilege and starts the audit trail, while adding almost no friction to the working day. Approval workflows arrive afterwards, on the roles that genuinely justify them, once activating has become routine.
We build emergency access properly before we start
Break-glass accounts stay outside the model, with credentials stored securely, sign-in monitored and alerted on, and a scheduled test so that somebody has genuinely used one before the day it matters. Since removal of the last active Global Administrator is blocked by the product, lockout was never the real risk here. The real risk is an emergency account nobody has tested, which is reassurance rather than a control.
We include service principals and managed identities
Assignments go to users, to groups, to service principals and to managed identities, and it is the non-human ones that get overlooked almost every time. An automation account holding permanent Contributor rights across a subscription is exactly the same exposure as a person holding them, with the added problem that nobody is ever likely to review it.
We configure for the audit you will actually face
Where the reason for doing this is a SOC 2 examination, a HIPAA risk analysis, an NYDFS Part 500 obligation, a CMMC assessment or an insurance renewal, the configuration ought to produce exactly the evidence that particular reviewer will ask for. Two artifacts answer most privileged access questions outright: access reviews running on a defined cadence, and downloadable audit history covering the whole review period.
Six US situations where standing privilege is the actual risk.
A regulated firm asked to evidence privileged access control
Banks, lenders, insurers, broker-dealers and anyone sitting under NYDFS Part 500 or the FTC Safeguards Rule gets asked three direct questions about administrative access: how it is granted, how it is limited, and how it is reviewed. This answers all three with evidence produced by the product rather than with a policy document, and the downloadable audit history is usually the one artifact that closes the finding outright.
An organization using an external IT partner
Your provider needs administrative access to do the work, and does not need it between engagements. Time-bound eligible assignments behind an approval mean the access exists while work is happening and lapses when it stops, with the audit history recording precisely what was done during each visit. Both sides come out ahead of the usual arrangement, which is a permanent account nobody reviews.
An organization that cannot say how many administrators it has
This is where most engagements begin. Roles were handed out across several years, people moved into different jobs, projects wrapped up, and nothing was ever taken away. The opening exercise is simply resolving what privileged assignments exist right now, nested groups and non-human identities included, and the number that comes back is reliably higher than anyone predicted.
After a phishing incident involving an administrator
Once an administrative credential has been exposed, the first question asked is what that account could reach. Under permanent assignment the answer is everything, immediately, with no delay in between. This changes that answer for next time, and it also happens to be the moment when nobody in the room finds the operational friction argument persuasive any more.
Azure subscriptions with permanent Owner and Contributor
Coverage runs across Azure resource roles as well as Entra roles, and the Azure side is usually in the worse state of the two, because subscriptions collect assignments throughout every project that touches them. Permanent Owner rights on a production subscription, held by somebody who last worked on it two years ago, is an entirely routine finding, and it represents more exposure than most of what turns up on the Entra side.
An organization where nothing has ever expired
Once eligibility is time-bound, with extension and renewal available, the default flips. Access stops unless somebody asks for it to continue, rather than persisting indefinitely. Both extension and renewal need approval from a Global Administrator or a Privileged Role Administrator, which makes continuation a decision somebody consciously takes instead of the result of nobody looking.
How privileged access is actually held in most US tenants.
| Feature | PIM configured | Reviewed occasionally | Permanent assignments |
|---|---|---|---|
Administrative privilege held continuously | No | Yes | Yes |
Approval required before elevation | Yes | No | No |
MFA enforced at the moment of elevation | Yes | No | No |
Reason recorded for each use of privilege | Yes | No | No |
Somebody notified when a role is activated | Yes | No | No |
Assignments expire without action | Yes | No | No |
Access reviews run on administrative roles | Yes | Sometimes | No |
Downloadable audit history for an auditor | Yes | Partial | Partial |
Exposure if an admin account is compromised | Limited | Full | Full |
Frequency in the US mid-market | Uncommon | Common | Very common |
The vocabulary, because the conversation is impossible without it.
Term
Eligible
- What it means
- An assignment where the person has to do something before the role can be used
Term
Active
- What it means
- An assignment requiring nothing at all, where the privileges are simply held
Term
Activate
- What it means
- Carrying out whatever is required, which might be an MFA check, a written reason, or an approval
Term
Permanent eligible
- What it means
- Permanently able to activate the role, with nothing ending that eligibility
Term
Permanent active
- What it means
- Holds the role permanently with nothing to do, which is where nearly every tenant begins
Term
Time-bound eligible
- What it means
- Eligible to activate only within start and end dates
Term
Time-bound active
- What it means
- Holds the role only within start and end dates
Term
Just-in-time access
- What it means
- Temporary permissions granted only when needed, expiring afterwards
Term
Least privilege
- What it means
- Minimum privileges needed for authorized tasks, using specific roles rather than Global Administrator
Five steps, staged so it does not get reversed.
- 1
Resolve who actually holds privilege today
We resolve every Entra role assignment and every Azure resource role assignment in full, following nested groups all the way down and picking up service principals and managed identities along the way. That inventory has value on its own, and it is usually the point at which the project gets its budget, because the number it produces exceeds whatever anybody had claimed.
- 2
Build and test emergency access
Break-glass accounts are put outside the model, their credentials secured, sign-in alerting configured against them, and each one genuinely tested so a real person has used it before the day it is needed. All of that happens before a single assignment is changed, never afterwards.
- 3
Convert to eligible with light activation requirements
Permanent active assignments convert to eligible ones, requiring multifactor authentication and a written reason at activation, with a sensible ceiling on duration and nobody approving anything at this stage. Standing privilege goes away, the audit trail starts, and how people work barely changes.
- 4
Approval and time limits get added only where they justify themselves
Approval goes onto the highest roles, with approvers who can actually be reached and a written path for the times they cannot. Eligibility becomes time-bound for contractors, suppliers and anything tied to a project, so that eligibility itself finishes on a date instead of running on indefinitely.
- 5
Set the review rhythm and the audit output
Access reviews run on a set cadence to establish whether people still need what they hold, activation notifications get routed to somebody who will read them, and there is a written process for producing the downloadable audit history the moment an auditor asks for it. That last item takes about ten minutes to prepare and saves a full day when the audit arrives.
What US organizations ask about Privileged Identity Management.
Fifteen questions worth answering first.
Scope
- How many permanent Global Administrators do you have?Whatever number comes back, the real one is almost always higher.
- Does this reach Azure resource roles, or only the Entra ones?PIM covers both, plus PIM for Groups.
- Do service principals or managed identities hold roles?An assignment can land on a user, a group, a service principal or a managed identity.
- Do any vendors or contractors hold administrative roles?The strongest early case for time-bound eligibility.
- Have you confirmed licensing?PIM requires licensing, which we check against your tenant.
Operational reality
- Who approves activation, and are they reachable?An approver on vacation becomes an outage.
- What is the maximum activation duration you want?Administrators choose within a maximum you set.
- Do you have emergency access accounts?Excluded, secured, monitored and tested on a schedule.
- Would MFA at activation work for your admins?Enforced role by role, and a stronger control than requiring MFA only at sign-in.
- Who receives activation notifications?Somebody other than the person elevating.
Audit and governance
- Has anybody asked you to evidence privileged access control?An auditor, an insurer, a regulator or an enterprise customer.
- Do you run access reviews on administrative roles today?PIM can conduct them rather than a spreadsheet.
- Could you show us a record of every elevation and the reason given?Audit history is downloadable for exactly this.
- Do assignments currently ever expire?In most tenants nothing expires, which is the finding.
- Who reviews the audit history, and how often?Decide before deployment, not at audit time.
The pages around this one.
Privileged access audit
The wider exercise: every privileged path across the estate, not only the Microsoft roles PIM governs.
Emergency access accounts
The break-glass accounts every PIM deployment depends on, built and tested to Microsoft guidance.
Conditional Access
Where the conditions for granting any access get decided, administrative access included.
Start with one number: how many permanent Global Administrators exist in your tenant right now.
We work that out properly, following nested groups down and counting service principals and managed identities alongside the people. In most tenants the answer makes the case without any help from us. Nothing about your standing privilege changes until you decide it should.
Related Services
Explore more solutions that work great with this service
Privileged Access Audit
Privileged access audits for US organizations: enumeration of every
Learn moreEmergency Access Account Design
Break-glass emergency access account programs for US organizations:
Learn moreMicrosoft Entra Workload Identities
Workload identity governance for US organizations: applications
Learn moreMicrosoft Entra Access Reviews
Entra access review programs for US organizations: entitlement
Learn moreMicrosoft Entra ID Governance
Entra ID Governance implementation for US organizations: automating
Learn moreMicrosoft Entra
Identity and access management solutions
Learn more